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Postmodernism, the Relational Self,
Constructive Theraries, and Beyond:
A Conversation With Kenneth Gergen

A long-time proponent of a social constructionist perspective, Kenneth
Gergen is Professor of Psychology at Swarthmore College in Swarthmore,
Pennsylvania. His wide-ranging interests, along with those of his colleague
and wife, Mary Gergen, bridge intellectual traditions and popular culture. His edited volumes include The Self in Social Interaction (Gordon &
Gergen, 1968), Historical Social Psychology (K. J. Gergen & Gergen, 1984),
The Social Construction of the Person (Gergen & Davis, 1985), Texts of Identity
(Shotter & Gergen, 1989), Everyday Understanding: Social and Scientific Implications (Semin & Gergen, 1990), Therapy as Social Construction (McNamee
& Gergen, 1992), and Historical Dimensions of Psychological Discourse
(Graumann & Gergen, 1993). His authored books include Toward Transformation in Social Knowledge ( 1985a), the much-acclaimed The Saturated
Self- Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life ( 1991 ), and Realities and Relationships: Soundings in Social Construction ( 1994a) .
Perhaps especially apropos of the postmodern sensibility discussed
herein, the following interview was not conducted in one time, place, or
state of mind. Rather, questions were asked, answered, adumbrated, and
amplified over many months, from airplanes, trains, offices, hotels, and
homes. The conversation commenced in June 1994. When Gergen graOriginally appeared, with changes, in M. F. Hoyt (Ed.) (1996), Constructive Therapies, Volume 2 (pp. 347-368). New York: Guilford Press. Used with permission.
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ciously telephoned in response to my letter of invitation, I quickly asked,
"Why did you call your Networker speech [Gergen, 1992] 'The Polymorphous Perversity of the Postmodern Era' rather than 'The Polymorphous
Diversity'? I know the reference to Freud [1905/1953], 1 but 'perversity'
implies a deviance from a 'normal' or 'right' way." Gergen responded,
"Let's talk." Our conversation, constructed over time, follows.

Hoyt: How do you conceptualize the "self," and how does this change
moving from a modern to a postmodern perspective?
Gergen: For purposes of contrast, let's start with the tradition we inherit
in the West, one which posits some form of inner essence. Whether we
are speaking of Christian religion and its belief in a soul; Romanticists of
the past century, with their championing of passion, inspiration, or elan
vital; recent existentialist thinkers and their emphasis on conscious choice;
or the belief of modernists in reason or cognition-all begin with the assumption of an essential core of the self. It is this essence that constitutes
one's being and without which one would be something less than human.
As a social constructionist, I view all these perspectives as culturally
and historically situated. It is not that they are mistaken, somehow failing
to see the self as it truly is. The mistake is perhaps in presuming that we
can determine "what truly is." The words we use to describe our being
are not simply pictures of what exists, not maps of a territory. Rather,
they construct us as this or that, and in doing so serve as logics for action.
I think it is this de-essentializing that is the major ingredient of the move
from the modern to postmodern conception of self. Within the spectrum
of postmodern thought, it is the social constructionist who will treat the
self as a manifestation of human interchange.
Hoyt: If the self is socially constructed, is there something essential that
may be shaped or influenced, but is not created sui generis ? I'm thinking,
for example, of Stern's [1985] studies of infant development and Margaret Mahler's [Mahler, Bergman, & Pine, 1975] ideas about the "psychological birth of the infant." Other writers, such as Singer and Salovey
[I 993], have suggested that one's sense of self is "remembered"-organized or influenced by cognitive-affective processes.
Gergen: Again, the challenge for the constructionist is to avoid pronouncements about what is essential. This is not to say that the constructionist doesn't participate in culture, and would not use words like soul,
intentional choice, cognition, and the like. Rather, it is to recognize that when
we use these utterances we are participating in a particular set of cultural
traditions, and not pronouncing truth beyond culture and history. To say
'In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud ( 1905/1953) used the phrase "polymorphous perversity" to describe the undetermined potential pansexuality of children.
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"I love you" is not then a description of a mental state; it is active participation in a deeply valued form of relationship.
To deal with your question more directly, I don't want to say either one
way or the other that there is or is not something essential to be shaped
or influenced. Rather, let's ask what hangs on the question for different
social or cultural practices. What will follow if I take one route in a conversation as opposed to another? As I mentioned previously, we have a
substantial tradition of essentialism, giving an affirmative answer to your
question. So for me as a scholar, I scarcely succeed in pressing our ideas
forward if I simply say, yet once again, "We are emotional beings," or
"cognitive beings," or "intentional beings."
One of my central interests has been to generate a new sense of what it
is to be a person, a sense of what I call a "relational self." The hope is to
transform the meaning of what it is to be a self-to have an identity,
emotion, memory, motivation, and the like-so that we can understand
it as constituted within relationship. Vygotsky [ 1986] and Bakhtin [ 1981]
are useful as first steps in this direction, as are Mead [1934] and Bruner
[1986]. However, in each of these cases there remains a strong commitment to an individual subjectivity that precedes relatedness. My hope
(and I must say that there are many scholars and therapists who are engaged in these dialogues) is to go beyond this work by positing relatedness as the essential matrix, out of which a conception of self (or identity,
emotion, etc.) is born, objectified, and embedded within action. On this
account, for example, emotion is a constructed category, and emotional
performance is culturally prescribed. However, such performances are
never cut away from a relational dance or scenario. We participate in the
dance together, and without the dance there would be no occasion for
the performance. In this sense, it is we who possess the emotion. Much of
this is spelled out in my new book, Realities and Relationships [1994a].
Hoyt: This is very consistent with the interactionalist notion that "the
basic unit of analysis is at least two people," as I recently heard Jay Haley
[1995, personal communication] express it, as well as the idea that "the
mind is not in the head" [Maturana & Varela, 1987]. In your view, where
is the unconscious? Is the term useful? Is there a self outside (beyond, below) narrative?
Gergen: As you can see, whether we posit an unconscious mind is optional. There is nothing about whatever we are that makes this kind of
description necessary. Our beliefs in the unconscious as a reality are also
culturally and historically situated, growing most recently from the soil of
2 See de Shazer's comments regarding Freud and Wittgenstein in Chapter 7 (this volume). For an extended discussion of the history of the idea of the unconscious, see
Ellenberger ( 1970).
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19th-century Romanticism. 2 However, whether the term is useful or not
is a very interesting one. It is not useful if what we mean by the term is
that the concept gives us an accurate description-"real" insight into human functioning. However, if what we mean by "useful" is viewed in
terms of social functioning-where does it get us in our relations to speak
of the unconscious?-then the answer would be very multifaceted.
Hoyt: How so?
Gergen: For example, the concept has been very useful in augmenting
our tendency to place moral judgment on the deviant in society. Rather
than simply placing moral blame on the rapist, child molester, or murderer-leading unequivocally to punishment-the concept of the unconscious adds to our cultural repertoire by enabling us to see the deviant as
in some sense "ill." We think increasingly, then, about ways to restore the
individual to full functioning (as opposed to forms of punishment that
will virtually ensure their remaining deviant). There is much more that
could be said on behalf of the concept of the unconscious. However, there
is also a very strong down side, and I guess I find it more compelling than
the positive account. Here I am speaking of the many critiques of the
assumption of the unconscious, for example, for its reducing all problems
to the intrapsychic level, its blindness to cultural and economic conditions, its championing of the authority of the all-knowing doctor (in contrast to the ignorant patient), its alliance with the medical model of illness, and its providing the individual excuses for all forms of brutishness. 3
Hoyt: How do you define therapy? Is that the right word? What might be
an alternative?
Gergen: I would prefer not to define it. Rather, let's say that we find
ourselves at this time in cultural history engaged in a range of interrelated conversations in which the concept of therapy plays a very significant role. The precise meaning of the term is contested, and it should
ideally remain so. To legislate in this case would be to stop the conversation,
oppress the many voices, and arbitrarily and misleadingly freeze history.
Hoyt: How do you currently see the therapeutic endeavor?
Gergen: My preference in this conversation is to view therapy as a process of constructing meaning. To be sure, we exist in what we commonly
call "real-world" conditions-"biological," "material," "economic," and the
like. However, in the main what we take to be the successes and failures
in our lives, the worthwhile and the worthless, the satisfying as opposed
to the frustrating, are byproducts of human meaning. It is not so much
"how things are" as how we interpret them that will typically bring us
'See also Michael White's discussion in Chapter 2 of how even altruistic acts can be
destructively made suspect, pathologized, and invalidated.
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into therapy. A physical touch may itself be unremarkable; however, in
different frames of meaning it may spark a sense of friendly support, move
one to ecstasy, or incite litigation for harassment. A blow to the chin will
send a family member in search of a therapist, but will move a boxer to
change his tactics. With this emphasis in place, we are invited to see effective therapy as a transformation in meaning. However, as you can see
from the preceding remarks, I don't see this transformation principally as
a cognitive event. Rather, it is an alteration in actions-relying importantly on language but not at all limited to language.
Hoyt: As therapy moves more into postmodern context, what are the
continuities from past tradition and practice, and what "new directions"
should we consider? It would be perhaps premature and too specific to
propose a curriculum, but what do you see as the major issues and challenges?
Gergen: These are very complicated issues and we could talk at length.
For now, however, let me focus on just one aspect of what many see as
the postmodern condition, and its particular implications for therapeutic
practice. As I tried to describe in The Saturated Self[I 991], the communication technologies of this century bring us into confrontation with a
vastly expanded range of others-both in terms of physical presence and
vicarious figures of the media. Our otherwise parochial worlds become
shattered by the intrusion of a multiplicity of opinions, values, attitudes,
personalities, visions, and ways of life. At the same time, there has been
an increasing tendency for various groups to generate common consciousness. Again, the technologies allow otherwise voiceless people to organize, develop common goals, consider entitlements, and so on.
Under these conditions of increasing pluralism, it is very difficult for
any therapeutic school to claim-as was long the tendency-ubiquitous
authority. To reduce all problems, for example, to early family conditions,
conditioned responses, or deficits in self-regard not only seems excessively parochial, but in a certain sense tyrannical.
Hoyt: The death of an orthodoxy makes it difficult to organize a
counterorthodoxy.
Gergen: How then does therapeutic practice respond to these conditions?
Of course, the most common practice among therapists is simply to "go
eclectic." Rather than continuing in the school favored in their training,
they continue to explore, learn, adapt, and eventually develop multilayered approaches. In my view, a constructionist orientation favors just this
kind of practice, but as well furnishes such practice with a needed sense
of integration and purpose.
Hoyt: I prefer the term mu/tilayered or multitheoretica/ rather than eclectic.
Being multiply informed is important, but to me eclectic sometimes seems
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like a cross between electric and chaotic, a directionless hodgepodge of techniques.4
Gergen: We could also use the term polyvocal, which better fits the metaphor of conversation. In any case, the greater the range of "vocabularies"
available to the therapist, the greater his or her efficacy within wideranging relationships. At the same time, the constructionist therapist is
drawn to the use-value of these various vocabularies (words and actions)
as they are developed in the therapeutic relationship, and extended to
further relationships outside. How well do the vocabularies travel, and
what do they do to and for people's lives as they are pressed into action?
Hoyt: Holy hermeneutics! If modernism gave us "ontological insecurity,"
postmodernism could produce a panic attack! As Sheila McNamee and
you [1992, p. 2] have commented, "Little confidence now remains in the
optimistic program of scientifically grounded progress toward identifying
'problems' and providing 'cures."' With conventional standards of "what's
right" no longer valid compasses, what suggestions do you have for therapists as we search for (and co-create) therapeutic realities with our clients? Any guides for the perplexed?
Gergen: At the outset, I think we must all remain humble and interdependent in the face of the problem. This is not the time to look to a new
guru who can remove our perplexities; we must together work toward
new visions. With this said, my own preference is for a therapeutic approach that appreciates the force of local realities, but within an expanded
context of connection. By this, I mean that the therapist would not begin
with a single set of criteria as to what constitutes an effective intervention
or a cure. Rather, he or she would be maximally sensitive to how such
matters are defined within the local communities. What are the standards for judging satisfaction or dissatisfaction within the most immediate relationships at hand? At the same time, the therapist must remain
concerned with the fuller range of relationships in which the immediate
case is embedded. Meaning within the local condition is ultimately dependent upon broader cultural context. Again, this won't lead to a single
standard. But the point is to allow the mix of standards into the therapeutic conversation.
Hoyt: This gets at one of the challenges of a multicultural society, where
different groups have different mores and standards. How do we steer
4Like Pirandello's Six Characters in Search of an Author, the practice of therapy has sometimes seemed like • 100 Techniques in Search of a Theory." Surveying the psychotherapy
field, Hoyt and Ordover ( 1998; also see Neimeyer & Freixas, 1990) called for a •unified
field theory" to coordinate the various •strong forces" that theorists and practitioners have
evolved. A constructionist perspective provides this meta-potential.
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between the Scylla of a Balkanized, "anything goes" separatism and the
Charybdis of a colonization by the dominant culture?
Gergen: It is in the mix of voices, it seems to me, that we find the answer-in the blending, appropriation, and paradox. Yet, a therapist could
find a family in which a certain degree of incestual activity or physical
abuse was tolerated-simply "not part of the problem" as they see it. In
this sense, it wouldn't be the therapist's immediate task to deconstruct
the family's system of beliefs (legal issues notwithstanding). However,
given the ultimate interdependence of this family on the broader array of
cultural meanings, in the longer run therapy might usefully be directed
to coordinating family meanings (and actions) with those of the dominant society.
Hoyt: In the last chapter of Therapy as Social Construction [McNamee &
Gergen, 1992], Efran and Clarfield [1992] review what they consider to
be "sense and nonsense" in constructionist therapy. They evoke Coyne's
[1982] term "epistobabble" and note, to use their words [p. 200], that
some critics dismiss such therapies as "little more than recombinations of
familiar 'reframing' and team observation techniques already in use. They
question whether constructionist lingo will prove any more substantive
or long-lived than a dozen earlier infatuations." What do you see as truly
different and likely to endure?
Gergen: It's difficult to understand why Efran and Clarfield were so hostile-to almost everyone unfortunate enough to draw their gaze. I think
disagreements can be useful and wonderful means toward new visions,
but it seems primitive to me to abuse your colleagues in the ways they
selected.
Hoyt: Beyond the mean-spiritedness of their critique, what is added?
Gergen: In my view, the importance of social constructionism to current
therapeutic theory and practice is that it enables many practitioners to
articulate emerging beliefs and practices in such a way that they can more
clearly see ( 1)how they truly differ from the "modernist" tradition; (2)
the similarities between what they are doing and what many others are
doing in the field; and (3)how their orientation is related to a vast range
of cultural changes, including major intellectual transformations in the
academy and changes in societal life patterns. I don't see constructionism
as offering just another model of therapy, another "silver bullet" cure, a
specialized vocabulary, or a new set of "musts." Rather, I see constructionism as inherent in a vast array of conversations taking place around
the world-conversations that bring people together over pressing issues
of common concern. To be sure, there are a circumscribed array of topics
in these conversations, and in this sense constructionist discussions cannot do everything one might wish. However, they do raise fundamental

A Conversation With Kenneth Gergen

191

questions about long-cherished traditions in Western culture. Given the
rapid changes taking place in meanings, values, and practices, and the
enormous conflicts among meaning systems around the world, they are
likely to remain focal for some time.
Hoyt: Raising consciousness via the question, as Watzlawick [1976-also
see Chapter 6, this volume] put it, "How real is real?", recognizing that
we are "constructive" [Hoyt, 1994a, 1996, 1998] and that reality is "invented" [Watzlawick, 1984], could have, if not a humbling effect, at least
suggest some pause and respect. It could open dialogic space, one would
hope. In this regard, let me note that in your Foreword [Gergen, 1993] to
Friedman's The New Language of Change, you comment that this shift entails a "formidable change of seas" in which there is "the suspicion of all
reality posits .... coupled with a related distrust of the authoritative voice"
[p. x]. 5 Given that we cannot stand outside the equation, how can we
practice therapy without imposing our values or ethics?
Gergen: There is no therapy that stands outside values or ethics; even

the most politically neutral therapist is acting for good or ill by some standard. Given this fact, many therapists are drawn to the conclusion that
therapy should thereby operate as advocacy. If we are bound to be advocates in any case, it is reasoned, then why not be clear and open about
what it is we stand for and what we are against, and use therapy to build
a better society? In certain ways I am drawn to this kind of thinking; it is
surely an improvement over the old modernist attempt to step outside
the conversation by declaring value neutrality. However, I also worry about
the implications of the advocacy orientation if it is fully extended. Can
you imagine the results for the profession if we split into hundreds of
political encampments-the gay, the gray, the lesbian, the black, the

'Gergen ( 1998) also wrote the Foreword to The Handbook of Constructive Therapies (Hoyt,
1998), in which he said:
The present volume forms an implicit commentary on the waning of concepts pivotal to the age of modernism: truth, objectivity, rationality, and moral principle. All
too often we have found that such concepts have functioned to impede the flow of
cultural conversation. Too often they have been used to delimit the nature of our
expressions, to separate those allowed to participate in determining our collective
future from those who are silenced, and ultimately to create self-rationalizing hierarchies of privilege .... [W]e must recognize and grapple with intelligibilities of all
forms and varieties, for it is in the to and fro of the ensuing interchange that our best
hopes for the future may be located. Thus, with the waning of the modernist faith in
a "single great ordering" we find here the emergence of an alternative vision, one
emphasizing at once the value of diversity and the simultaneous need for coordinating forms of communication. Whether on the level of individual life, the family, the
community, or global relationships, our hope lies in the "con-joint" construction of
the real and the good.
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Chicano, the Asian, and so on-each with suspicion or antipathy toward
the other? This would be multi-culturalism gone mad. If we separate along
moral-political lines, not only do we diminish the possibility for dialogue
and communality, but we also generate a therapeutic world of all against
all. Perhaps you can see again why I favor forms of therapy that enable
people to speak in many voices, to comprehend the paradoxes in their
own values, to appreciate the positive force of many local intelligibilities.
The challenge here would not be to locate the one right position, ethic, or
political ideal; nor would it be to suppress informed political action. Rather,
it is to enable people to move with greater fluidity in the world, with a
greater potential perhaps for coordinating the disparate as opposed to
eradicating the opposition. 6
Hoyt: You have written eloquently [Gergen, 1994b] about ways that the
therapeutic professions have developed and disseminated a language of
mental deficit-a language that creates hierarchies, dependencies, and
endless ways of constructing the self as deficient. We now seem to have a
flood of new self disorders, such as "multiple personality disorder," "narcissistic disorder," "borderline disorder," "codependency," and the like.
How can we redress this situation? Can we reeducate the profession, the
media, and the public? 7
Gergen: I do think the therapeutic community has provided an invaluable resource to people over the years, and particularly as the traditional
social bonds have eroded. As families, committed friendships, and communities disappear into the past, therapists continue to "be there" for
''"Being transparent," laying our cards on the table, can help reduce subtle or duplicitous
manipulation; but we may also need to embrace, not erase, inevitable tensions. Writing
within the context of race relations, West ( 1994, pp. 150-151) suggests jazz as a useful
metaphor:
I use the term "jazz" here not so much as a term for a musical art form, as for a mode
of being in the world, an improvisational mode of protean, fluid, and flexible dispositions toward reality suspicious of "either/or" viewpoints, dogmatic pronouncements,
or supremacist ideologies .... The interplay of individuality and unity is not one of
uniformity and unanimity imposed from above but rather a conflict among diverse
groupings that reach a dynamic consensus subject to questioning and criticism. As
with a soloist in a jazz quartet, quintet, or band, individuality is promoted in order to
sustain and increase the creative tension with the group-a tension that yields higher
levels of performance to achieve the aim of the collective project.
'See the discussion by de Shazer and Weakland in Chapter I (this volume), "On the
Importance of Keeping It Simple and Taking the Patient Seriously,• including their discussion of whether one functions as a mental health professional or a mental illness professional; see also Gergen's ( 1994b) remarks, "On Taking Ourselves Seriously." Some commentators, such as Masson ( 1994), seem to have gone so far as to conclude that the whole idea
of professional psychotherapy in inherently wrong, and have suggested that it be abandoned and replaced with self-help groups.
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support, insight, renewal, and the like. And given our technologies of
saturation, this trend is only likely to continue. However, if there is one
marked failure of the therapeutic communities, it is not in terms of outcome evaluation. (Personally, I think outcome evaluations are no more
than window dressing for a given school of therapy, and the entire concept is misleading.) Rather, there has been a profound disservice in generating an enormous set of concepts through which people can see themselves as deficient. Worse, these vocabularies are self-serving; when people
come to believe they possess these "diseases" or "failings," a therapist is
required for "cure."
Yes, to be sure, education can be an important means of redress. However, this first means a major change within the therapeutic community.
That is, it is first necessary to get our own house in order. Family therapists have been in the vanguard of criticism of diagnosis; however, there
is simultaneously a move within the family arena to develop an entirely
new range of deficit categories-namely, relational diagnostics. And there
are still the clinical psychology and psychiatric professions for whom these
deficit categories are no less than maps of the real world.
Coupled with this self-critical effort, and perhaps more realistic, is the
decoupling of diagnosis and third-party billing procedures. 8 So long as
diagnostic categories are necessary for insurance payments, the professions will knuckle under. This procedure can and should be reversed.
After all, we have learned to live with "no-fault" divorce processes. Why
can the same logic not apply in the case of difficulties in living? The day is
also soon coming when an activist ex-mental patient will bring lawsuits
against therapists for such unjustifiable and injurious classification. Perhaps such litigation can speed the process of change.
Hoyt: Some cultures, such as the traditional Balinese (Suryani & Jensen,
1993], create or construct "selves" that in some ways resemble the condition we call "multiple personality disorder" [MPD]. Other writers, such as
Glass [1993] in Shattered Selves: Multiple Personality in a Postmodern World,
are very critical of postmodern conceptions of the self, arguing that true
MPD 9 is a fragmentation of self resulting from horrible childhood abuse
and that such individuals suffer greatly for having to live without a firm

•see Wylie's ( 1995) trenchant article, "Diagnosing for Dollars" in the Family Therapy
Networker issue, "The Power of DSM-IV." See also Blum (1978), Tomm (1990), and Kirk
and Kutch ins ( 1992). Long ago Ambrose Bierce ( 1906/ 1957, p. 36) offered this definition
from The Devil's Dictionary : "Diagnosis, n., A physician's forecast of disease by the patient's
pulse and purse."
9 MPD is now called "dissociative identity disorder" in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994). A good pros and cons summary of issues is available in Spiegel and
McHugh (l 995).
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identity. How do you see the relationship between a postmodern view of
"self" and "multiple personality disorder"?
Gergen: First, the assumptions embraced by Glass-that there simply
are "MPD" persons in the world, and that they chiefly suffer from the lack
of a firm identity-are exactly the kind of mentality I view as detrimental
to the culture. Such presumptions not only serve to objectify the "illness," and to suggest that others may also possess this particular infirmity,
but as well imply that there is something privileged in a state of "unified
and coherent" being. In a certain sense, then, this kind of analysis is part
of the problem.
Now this is not to doubt that Glass confronts clients who are in deep
pain, and that they can understand themselves in just the way he describes. But there are many other ways in which one's personality can be
rendered meaningful-many alternative conceptions that can be generated of what he is authoritatively classifying as "MPD." And many of these
alternatives would, in my view, be far more promising for the client (and
society) as they move from therapeutic relations into daily life. 10
There is also a certain genre of postmodern writing that provides just
such a promise. If one feels split among selves, torn between competing
tendencies, capable of multiple personalities, this literature suggests that
such a condition may be the newly emerging cultural form. And it is not
to be lamented-but explored for its potential riches. Contributions to
this genre would include the work of Jim Wertsch [l 985, 1991] in psychology, and Peggy Penn [1982, 1985; Penn & Frankfurt, 1994] in family
therapy.
Hoyt: Reading through some of the chapters in The Saturated Self in the
rapid way you recommend [Gergen, 1991, p. 49] did produce the existentially dizzying, almost disorienting "multiphrenic" 11 effect that, by parallel process, was the subject. The medium became the message, as Marshall
McLuhan [1964] said. Writers such as Kegan [1994] have suggested that
we're "in over our heads," that the complexity of (post)modern life exceeds our cognitive grasp. In "multiphrenia," what will provide a sense of
stability /identity/ self? 12
1°For discussion of some therapeutic alternatives, see Grove ( 1993 ), Grove and Haley
( 1993 ), Schwarz ( 1998), and O'Hanlon (Chapter 2, this volume).
"Gergen (1991, p. 16) describes

the fragmenting and populating of self-experience, a condition I call "multiphrenia."
Critical to my argument is the proposal that social saturation brings with it a general
loss of our assumption of true and knowable selves. As we absorb multiple voices,
we find that each "truth" is relativized by our simultaneous consciousness of compelling alternatives. We come to be aware that each truth about ourselves is a construction of the moment true only for a given time and within certain relationhips.
12Tom Hanks, the actor who played the title role in the film Forrest Gump, described preparing for the part: "I went to a school for mentally challenged kids who are now adults.
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Gergen: As you might guess from what I just said, we might ask, "What

is necessarily wrong with 'instability' and 'fragmentation'?" These are,
after all, negative labels for conditions that might also be described as
"fascinating," "exciting," and "transformative," on the one hand, and
"multifaceted" or "richly complex" on the other. The opposite of instability could be viewed as a boring and oppressive status quo, while the opposite of fragmentation might be seen as rigidity and narrow-mindedness.
This is not to say that I wish to abandon the quest for stability and
simplicity. There are days and hours in which I long for it. But I can also
understand these wishes in terms of my immersion in a cultural history
in which these conditions are valued, and understand that these yearnings are not for something fundamental, deeply ingrained in nature. They
are simply one of the facets or desires of self within the vast multiplicity.
That idea in itself I find helpful.
Hoyt: What will character mean in a postmodern world? How do we
understand ethics and integrity (acting consistent with one's values) if we
are "saturated" and "polymorphous"?
Gergen: I do feel that postmodern writers have been unfairly criticized
for their inability to support firm moral values and their exploration of
relativism. 13 For who in this century, outside the highly parochial and
fanatic, are willing to declare what is good and right for all people for all
time? The postmodern writers are too frequently scapegoated for the incapacities of those who criticize.
I also feel that in their explorations of relativism, multiple selves, and
constructed realities, postmodern writings open important new vistas in
our comprehension of morality and for practices more fully suited to living together in a world of differences. They suggest, for one, that we should
cease looking to a slate of ideals, ethical foundations, a code of justice, or
canons of morality in order to create "good persons" or "the just society."
High-sounding words and phrases themselves require nothing in the way
of subsequent action, and may be interpreted in so many ways that even
the most violent persecution can be justified on the basis of the most
glowing ideals. I believe we should turn away from abstract justifications
and look to ourselves, to our relationships. For it is out of these relationBut Forrest wasn't quite like that. It was more like creating an alien. What are the rules of
his world? It was like creating a whole new take on the universe" (Morrison, 1994, p. 49).
His intellectual limitations and resultant literalism seemed to render Forrest a kind of "master
of deconstruction." Is part of Forrest's wide appeal that he is today's Everyman (and
Everywoman) looking for simple truths amidst the multiphrenia? Everyone is not as sweet
and open-minded as Forrest, however. Might there be the peril that too much complexity,
especially if coupled with economic hard times, could generate a backlash "escape from
freedom" (Fromm, 1976) of reactionary fundamentalism?
"See the exchange between Gergen (1994c, also 1985b) and Smith (1994), plus Comment ( 1995 ), for their (and others') responses to the dialogue.
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ships that we generate the hells for ourselves that we term unjust, oppressive, immoral, and so on.
Hoyt: I take what you're saying as suggesting a higher moral challenge.
If we give up the notion of an "ultimate truth," then we have to take full
responsibility for all of our constructions and actions, and realize that others are just as entitled to theirs.
Gergen: Almost. Faced now with ourselves, we may then together ask
about the kinds of practices that bring about these conditions, and the
ways in which these practices might be altered. This kind of thinking has
also inspired some work I am doing with Sheila McNamee [McNamee &
Gergen, 1995) on what we are calling "relational responsibility." Here we
are raising criticisms with the traditional view of holding individuals morally responsible for problematic actions, and trying to develop some conversational resources that might enable people to explore the forms of
relatedness in which the problematic action takes place.
Hoyt: I expect that this may be related to the experience you wrote about
[Gergen, l 994e, pp, 76-77] in "The Limits of Pure Critique." Let me quote
at length:
At the beginning of a three-day conference, the organizers arranged a confrontation pitting radical constructivism (as represented by Ernst von
Glazerfeld) against social constructionism (which I was to profess). The
subsequent critiques were unsparing, the defenses unyielding, and as the
audience was drawn into the debate polarization rapidly took place. Voices
became agitated, critique turned ad hominem, anger and alienation
mounted. As the moderator called a halt to the proceedings, I began to see
the three days before me as an eternity.... Here [Karl] Tomm asked if von
Glazerfeld and I would be willing to be publicly interviewed. Most important, would we be willing to do so as the other? Uneasily, we agreed .... Our
exposure to each other did allow each of us to absorb aspects of the otherintellectual views, attitudes, values-which we now carried with us as potentials. The initial question was whether we were willing and able to give
these potentials credible voice. Through an extended series of questions,
carefully and sensitively addressed, Tomm was able to elicit 'the other
within.' Playing the other's identity, we discussed issues of theory, views of
the other, self-doubts, fears, personal relationships, feelings about the conference and so on.
The results of the procedure were striking. As both we and the audience
learned, we could communicate intelligibly and sympathetically from within
the other's framework. Each could give voice to the rationality of the other.
Further, the binary was successfully broken. Rather than a showdown between competing epistemologies, the debate could be understood within
the context of a long interpersonal history, imbricated friendships, private
aspirations and doubts, the demands of public debate and so on. A new
level of discussion ensued. The conference was thereafter marked by its
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civility of interchange; there was expression without domination, careful
listening and sensitive reply. No, this did not mean a resolution of differences; the lines of difference remained clear. However, it did allow the
exploration to move forward, and with the resulting emergency of new
complexities, the old yearnings for victory and defeat-heroes and villainsreceded from view.

When I recently asked David Epston what he would like to ask you, he
called my attention to this passage and said he would ask, "Where do you
think you will take such developments both in the realm of ideas and
everyday life from here?" Pray tell?
Gergen: On the theoretical side, you might imagine from my earlier comments that my major concern is with expanding consciousness of relatedness. I call this "relational theory," a project that begins with Realities and
Relationships (Gergen, 1994a), but has since expanded in several directions. Given the quotation you just cited, you can imagine that such theorizing is directed toward more practical domains-including therapy, education, organizational management, and politics. The challenge is to bring
about metaphors, stories, distinctions, images, and so on that don't so
much reflect what is, but create what can be. I also work with various
therapists, organizational consultants, global businesses, and the like to
develop practices that embody a relational perspective. With some friends,
we created The Taos Institute, an institute centered in New Mexico that
brings theorists and practitioners together to work on cutting-edge issues
in relational process. Perhaps the most wonderful thing about this kind of
work is that you never feel you are alone-fully responsible for all the
ideas, plans, practices, outcomes, and so on. The work becomes lighter,
more joyous, and more optimistic. Also, I find the creative potential of
dialogue is just enormous.
Hoyt: The work of Michel Foucault [e.g., 1975, 1978, 1980], especially
his views on the relationship of power and knowledge, has influenced
many therapists working within narrative constructive frameworks. Not
everyone is so impressed, however. Camille Paglia [1992, p. 174] has
written: "Foucault's biggest fans are not among the majority of philosophers, historians, and sociologists, who usually perceive his glaring inadequacies of knowledge and argument, but among well-meaning but foggy
humanists, who virtually never have the intellectual and scholarly preparation to critique Foucault competently. The more you know, the less you
are impressed by Foucault." What do you think of Foucault's contribution, and what do you think of Paglia's dismissal?
Gergen: To pick up on an earlier theme, I don't look to Foucault or any
other writer now for "the truth," nor for a perfect and well-defended
logic, new set of guides, ideals, or premises for a new life. Rather, from
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my constructionist background, I am inclined to ask whether a given piece
of writing can offer resources for the kinds of conversations in which I
now find myself. If I borrow from the words, the metaphors, the logics
within the writing, what happens now to my various relationships? In
this sense I have found certain Foucaultian concepts very useful-as have
many others. They seem to help us do things in conversations that we
could less easily or not possibly do before. No, I don't find all of Foucault
so useful; by contemporary American standards the writing is often opaque,
incoherent, and mystifying, and his major analyses of history unjustifiable. However, in his critiques of earlier views of power, and in his emphasis on the relationship of language to power and on the effect of various professional discourses on society, for example, he has been
enormously useful.
Hoyt: How about Paglia?
Gergen: Along these same lines, I don't find Paglia so very helpful. If I
put her discourse into action, I am more likely to find myself in a set of
conflictual and aggressive relationships. To borrow her discourse too often leads to an argumentative form of relationship in which mutual annihilation is the implicit end. Do we need more of this in our current cultural condition?
Hoyt: In "The Social Construction of Narrative Accounts," you and Mary
Gergen [M. M. Gergen & Gergen, 1984; see also K. J. Gergen & Gergen,
1986, 1988; M. M. Gergen & Gergen, 1993] discuss progressive, stabilizing,
and regressive narratives. You also comment [1984, p. 177] that what might
look "regressive" could be a part of a forward movement ("unless the
crisis is viewed as a critical integer in a progressive narrative") or a larger
homeostasis. As the French say, to make an omelette you have first to
break the eggs. With multiphrenia and such a complexity of competing
goals, how is primacy established? What dialectic, what values guide complex, competing choices?
Gergen: Perhaps I can answer this in a way that will clarify what I was
trying to say regarding value positions. It seems to me that in the Western
tradition we are supposed to possess some personal logic, set of values, or
well-considered aim in life that should guide us through such complex
situations. Yet, it is just such a view that social constructionism calls into
question. From this perspective logic, values, aims, and the like are positions in language. As language they do not require any particular form of
action; they are action in themselves. And if they occur privately (what
we have traditionally considered "in the mind"), nothing necessarily follows in terms of "choices" (another term heavily weighted by our
psychologistic and individualistic tradition).
Further, as I have tried to stress, we might usefully see intelligible ac-
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tion in terms of its place within a set of relationships. In this context,
rather than trying to work out a fully developed set of priorities abstracted
from concrete conditions of relationship, it seems more promising from
the constructionist standpoint to immerse oneself more fully within ongoing relationships. This does not mean acting only within the present
moment, for one is also a participant in numerous other relationships.
These relationships, too, should ideally be made salient to the ongoing
process. I rather like as an illustration the actions of the unmarried pregnant adolescents interviewed in [Carol] Gilligan's [1982] In a Different
Voice. When confronted with the difficult question of abortion, they didn't
resort to abstract principles, but primarily engaged in an array of conversations-with friends, parents, the potential father, and so on. 14 From the
process of relating, decisions emerged-decisions which were presumably lodged within the array of existing coordinations. 15
Hoyt: There seem to be two opposite trends occurring simultaneously.
One involves the emergence of the Nrelational self," the other a tendency
toward greater isolation and loneliness. Do you agree? How do you understand the "relational self" and what's happening?
Gergen: There are a number of ways to go with this question; let me try
only one. There is a sense in which I want to argue that all selves are
relational, and always have been. (This position is part of my own attempt to create a sense of the reality of relatedness.) Unless a feral child
or severely cerebrally damaged, even the isolated individual (for example,
the elderly shut-in or the derelict) is immersed in otherness. At the same
time, I think you are absolutely correct in your surmise that people are
more physically isolated than ever before. This is part of the irony of The
141n fairness to Camille Paglia, in light of the earlier discussion it should be noted that in
an interview (Paglia, 1995, p. 58) she, too, advocated-without abandoning her in-yourface style-that recognition be given to the legitimacy of competing views in the abortion
controversy:

The people who are pro-abortion-I hate the cowardly euphemism of pro-choicemust face what they are opposing. The left constantly identifies the pro-life advocates as misogynists and fanatics, but that doesn't represent most of those people.
They are deeply religious and they truly believe that taking a life is wrong. If the left
were to show respect for that position and acknowledge the moral conundrum of
unwanted pregnancy, the opposition to abortion would lessen. We must acknowledge that people should be a little troubled by abortion. Not to acknowledge that
this is a difficult decision is wrong .... You have a stronger case if you give due
respect to the other side.
"As the well-known business negotiator Chester Karrass ( 1992, p. 11) observes, "The
children of tomorrow must be good negotiators. They must be prepared to resolve differences in a civilized way; to listen; to be responsible; and to be unafraid to adjust conflicting
values. The alternative in an age of rising expectations is violence." He goes on (p. 215) to
give some sage marital advice: "Love, honor, and negotiate."
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Saturated Self The very technologies that bring the teeming array of images, voices, dramas, logics, and so on into our lives (e.g., television, radio, mass print, telephone, VCRs, personal computers), are also the same
technologies that allow us to exist without others' physical presence. So
we are more multiply related but more physically alone. I worry a great
deal about this trend; the consequences for society are profound. A major
interest for me now is whether we might use some of these same technologies (and especially computer networks) to generate new forms of
community.
Hoyt: The information and networking possibilities are thrilling, but I
hope "virtual reality" and "cybersex" won't replace older forms! In We've
Had a Hundred Years of Psychotherapy and the World's Getting Worse, James
Hillman and Michael Ventura [ 1992] argue that the pendulum has swung
too far toward the individual self, producing a narcissistic preoccupation,
and call for a greater identification with society. Some religious and spiritual practices also advocate connection to humanity or nature as part of a
larger sense of self. How does this fit with your idea of the relational self?
Gergen: I entirely agree with the thesis that the pendulum has swung
too far toward the individual self. A narcissistic preoccupation is only one
of the problematic consequences. I'm less positive about a solution which
requires a greater identification with society, as it suggests that I exist
separate from society. In the same way I can resonate with some spiritual,
religious, and ecological movements which generate a sense of our greater
relatedness. A great deal of my recent work explores the ways in which
we are always already constituted by relationship. As I mentioned earlier,
I try to focus on various ways in which to be a self, to have an idea, to
possess an emotion is to be acting out of and into relatedness. And as in
the case of the work with McNamee [McNamee & Gergen, 1995], we try
to generate practices of relationship (as opposed to individual) responsibility. I am also working with therapists and organizational consultants to
bring these kinds of ideas into practice, and with an artist and a filmmaker in trying to give this consciousness a visual dimension.
Hoyt: In an earlier discussion with Michael White and Gene Combs [see
Chapter 3], I promised to ask you about your remarks at the end of your
keynote speech at the Therapeutic Conversations 2 conference in Washington, D.C., when you commented that "We don't live in narratives, we
live with them," and spoke of moving "beyond stories to relatedness itself."16 It's hard to talk about what is beyond words. At the risk of asking
16

Gergen's ( l 994f) words:
So is it right that we live in narratives? Well, the communicational view, this relational view that I'm trying to develop here would say, "No, we don't live in them,
we live with them. They are what we do with people .... • Well, if that's the case-
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an oxymoronic question, would you expound on the ineffable lightness
of being?
Gergen: My major aim in that conclusion was to "put language in its
place. " 17 That is, as we move in this constructionist and narrational direction, we sometimes fix on the words as ends in themselves. We try as
therapists to generate new sense of meaning, new narratives, new constructions, as if a new set of words would "do the trick." In fact, I tend to
talk that way myself at times. However, this is to miss the ultimate concern, which is relatedness itself-out of which meanings are generated.
In effect, relations precede meaning.
and this is the part that interests me-is it possible that we could imagine therapy or
relationships themselves as moving to the point where pure relatedness is honored
before the meaning? When you move, let's say, with a client not to the point where
they've got a good or better story, but beyond stories to relatedness itself. I tried at
one place to call this a kind of •relational sublime,• beyond reason. A sublime state
where one is simply in an inarticulable sense of relatedness with others, with the
world-not like swimming in an ocean, but more like being in the ocean and moving with all the waves, not like having a direction but moving in synchrony. A kind
of inarticulable state beyond meaning where one is simply embedded with: that intrigues me.
17As Gergen (1991, p. 157) explained in The Saturated Self:
The case is clarified by focusing on the languages of self-construction-the words
and phrases one uses to characterize the self .... It is impossible to sustain the traditional view of language as an outer expression of an inner reality. If language truly
served as the public expression of one's private world, there would be no means by
which we could understand each other. Rather, language is inherently a form of
relatedness. Sense is derived only from coordinated effort among persons. One's
words remain nonsense (mere sounds or markings) until supplemented by another's
assent (or appropriate action). And this assent, too, remains dumb until another (or
others) lend it a sense of meaning .... In this way, meaning is born of interdependence. And because there is no self outside a system of meaning, it may be said that
relations precede and are more fundamental than self. Without relationship there is
no language with which to conceptualize the emotions, thoughts, or intentions of
the self.
In his Foreword to The Handbook of Constructive Therapies, Gergen ( 1998, pp. xiv-xv) elaborates:
Central to the modernist tradition is the presumption of the individual mind as the
fundamental atom of society. It is the individual's capacity for independent thought
upon which our democratic institutions are based; it is on the basis of the individual's
capacity to love that we trust our institutions of intimacy; and it is the individual's
capacity for free agency that forms the foundation for our conceptions of moral
responsibility. Yet as the dialogues on constructive therapy unfold, we find the presumption of independent self-contained individuals increasingly problematic. To
construct an intelligible world essentially requires relationship; indeed, out of relationship emerges the very intelligibility of the individual self. In effect, the fundamental material out of which society emerges, from which institutions of democracy, intimacy, and moral responsibility derive, is that of relational process.
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However, in trying to speak about moving "beyond stories to relatedness itself" I find myself resisting clarity, wanting rather to move by intimation. This is because in the struggle to articulate a state of relatedness
out of which articulation springs, you rather place walls around that state;
you construct it as "this as opposed to that." 18 And in doing so relations
themselves are delimited. So I look to metaphors, ambiguous concepts, or
parables. In the concept of a relational sublime, I borrowed heavily from
the Romanticist idea of a mental condition which transcends the capacity
of rational comprehension [Gergen, 1996]. The Romanticists often used
the term to depict a condition in which one sensed the incomprehensible
scope and power of nature (and by implication, God). I rather like these
images, and feel that we might develop a sense of ourselves as fully immersed in relatedness-with all humanity, all that is given-and that we
might conceive of this awesome sensibility of pure relatedness (itself born
of relationship) as approaching what we might mean by the domain of
the spiritual.

Hoyt: We're all in this together. Thank you.

D
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